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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield Billions
by Darien Shanske, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, and David Gamage
I. Introduction
The federal government should be providing 
states and localities with hundreds of billions of 
dollars in aid.1 The arguments against such aid, 
including the claim that the states have somehow 
been profligate, do not stand up to scrutiny.2 
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the federal 
government will do enough,3 and it is already the 
case that the federal government is acting too 
slowly. States and local governments, which 
generally operate under balanced budget 
constraints, are, accordingly, already making 
sweeping cuts4 that will deepen the recession and 
reduce services when they are most needed.
Rather than make these cuts, it would be better 
to raise taxes on those that can afford to pay.5 In 
this essay, we will focus on one such set of 
taxpayers — large multinational corporations that 
have long circumvented both the state and federal 
corporate income taxes. Better yet, the reforms we 
propose represent good tax policy more generally: 
They are fair, efficient, and administrable. This 
essay is a contribution to Project SAFE: “State 
Action in Fiscal Emergencies”6 — an academic 
effort to help states weather the COVID-19 
economic crisis by providing policy 
recommendations backed by research.
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In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors argue that the current 
crisis is the perfect time to make revenue-
raising reforms to state corporate income taxes 
— reforms that would have been desirable 
policy improvements even during an 
economic upturn, but that are even more 
clearly good policy moves in light of the 
current and upcoming state economic and 
budgetary crises.
1
See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, “Disaster Relief to States and Cities Is 
Both Right and Good: Part 1 of 2,” Verdict, May 14, 2020; Buchanan, 
“Disaster Relief to States and Cities Is Both Right and Good: Part 2 of 2,” 
Verdict, May 18, 2020.
2
Richard C. Auxier, “McConnell’s Attempt to Blame States for 
COVID-19 Budget Shortfalls Is Wrong and Dangerous,” Urban Institute 
and Brookings Institution, Tax Policy Center, Apr. 24, 2020. Needless to 
say, there is also extraordinary hypocrisy given that the president and his 
congressional allies approved deficit-exploding tax cuts during an 
economic expansion.
3
Emily Cochrane, “GOP Split Over State Aid That Could Mostly Go 
to Democratic Strongholds,” The New York Times, May 11, 2020.
4
Amanda Albright, “States, Cities Cut Payrolls by Nearly 1 Million 
Over Shutdown,” Bloomberg, May 8, 2020.
5
David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the 
Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749 (2010). See also Gamage and 
Darien Shanske, “States Should Consider Partial Wealth Tax Reforms,” 
Tax Notes State, May 18, 2020, p. 859.
6
See Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in 
Fiscal Emergencies),” Tax Notes State, Apr. 27, 2020, p. 471.
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Before proceeding, a skeptic might note that 
state corporate income taxes represent only 
about 3 percent of state taxes, or about $53 billion 
per year,7 while estimates of the states’ need 
range from $500 billion8 to $1 trillion.9 There is no 
question that the reforms we propose in this 
essay will not raise $500 billion. Nevertheless, all 
the reforms we propose have the potential to 
raise substantial amounts of revenue. For 
instance, moving to worldwide combination has 
been reasonably estimated to have the potential 
to raise about $17 billion per year for the states.10 
That is a substantial amount on its own. Several 
of the other reforms below are of similar 
magnitude. Our back-of-the-envelope estimate 
for a deemed repatriation tax, outlined below, 
indicates a revenue potential for the states as 
high as $25 billion, or even significantly higher. 
To be sure, the recession might suppress some of 
these projections, but maybe not by that much, 
given that some firms are going to be very 
profitable during this pandemic. Further, if 
states put these reforms in place now, their 
revenues will not only bounce back faster, but 
they may be able to borrow against this 
anticipated future revenue right now.11
That the numbers here can be large should 
not be too surprising; the yield of the state 
corporate income tax has fallen sharply over the 
last few decades, even relative to the decline in 
federal corporate income taxes. In a sense, the 
reforms we propose would serve to partially 
restore the state corporate income tax bases to 
their prior levels.
For those still skeptical, here is another — 
albeit noisy — data point regarding the money 
that most states have left on the table, from New 
Jersey’s experience:
7
U.S. Census Bureau, “2017 State & Local Government Finance 
Historical Datasets and Tables” (last revised Oct. 30, 2019).
8
National Governors Association, “National Governors Association 
Outlines Need for ‘Additional and Immediate’ Fiscal Assistance to 
States,” Apr. 11, 2020.
9
Cochrane, supra note 3.
10
Richard Phillips and Nathan Proctor, “A Simple Fix for a $17 
Billion Loophole: How States Can Reclaim Revenue Lost to Tax Havens,” 
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (Jan. 17, 2019).
11
We will explore how states might do this in a further essay.
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This chart demonstrates some extraordinary 
growth in New Jersey’s corporate income tax after 
it passed several sensible reforms: In 2018 the 
state conformed to the global intangible low-
taxed income regime under the federal Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act of 2017, taxed 5 percent of the 
repatriation, moved to combined reporting (for 
2019), and imposed a 2.5 percent corporate 
income tax surcharge for 2018 and 2019 (1.5 
percent for 2020-21). To be sure, the actual 2020 
numbers are likely to be quite a bit lower because 
of the pandemic, and there are any number of 
other factors that bespeak caution in extrapolating 
too far from one state’s experience. Nevertheless, 
we think this chart indicates that — consistent 
with other data, some of which we discuss below 
— the state corporate income tax can be reformed 
in sensible ways that yield significant revenue.
It is not a good thing, in our view, that the 
states have let their corporate income taxes wither 
so that there is so much to be gained from 
straightforward reforms. However, in the current 
crisis this represents an opportunity. The states 
need only engage in some ordinary good tax 
housekeeping to revive their corporate income 
taxes. Though there may well be a need for 
stronger medicine that that at some point, it 
makes sense to start with reforms that are easy 
and practical.
The reforms we propose, in a thumbnail 
sketch, are as follows:
1. Tax the repatriation:12 Multinational 
corporations stashed $2 trillion in profits 
abroad. Many of those profits were earned in 
the United States and should have been taxed 
by the states.
12
For a more in-depth version of this argument, see Shanske and 
Gamage, “Why (and How) States Should Tax the Repatriation,” State Tax 
Notes, Apr. 23, 2018, p. 317.
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2. Shift to mandatory worldwide combination:13 
Multinational corporations are still shifting 
domestic profits abroad. The states can counter 
this by (reasonably) including these foreign 
subsidiaries in their corporate tax base.
3. Conform to GILTI:14 The TCJA made a half-
hearted attempt to combat income shifting. 
Though moving to worldwide combination 
would be better, conforming to GILTI at the 
state level is the least a state should do.
4. Income tax surcharge: A handful of major 
corporations will likely be very profitable over 
the next few years. States should add a 
temporary income tax surcharge to tax some of 
these profits.
5. Suspend some tax credits: States have been 
generous in giving large corporations credits 
from the corporate income tax. Credits of this 
magnitude were probably never a good idea, 
but given the current crisis, it is a particularly 
apt time to suspend these credits.
6. Reform the sales factor: States generally 
divide the income of multijurisdictional 
corporations based on their share of a 
corporation’s sales in the state. Some taxpayers 
have gotten good at manipulating the location 
of sales, but there are ways to make the formula 
harder to game.
7. Expand the corporate income tax to include 
all large businesses: There has been a shift to the 
use of noncorporate business entities for 
decades. It has never made sense that only 
corporations pay taxes at the entity level. This 
should be corrected.
II. The Repatriation
Under the international tax law regime that 
ended in 2018, the United States — at least 
nominally — sought to tax the profits of 
multinational corporations on the basis of their 
worldwide income. At the same time, the regime 
permitted U.S.-based multinationals to defer 
payment of tax on profits earned overseas until 
that money was brought home. Until a foreign 
subsidiary repatriated its profits to its U.S. parent, 
the profits were not subject to U.S. tax. Naturally, 
large multinational corporations left a lot of 
money — over $2 trillion15 — stashed abroad.
Much of that money represented profits on 
sales to U.S. residents and profits from the sale of 
intellectual property developed in the United 
States. Under the prior tax regime, U.S.-based 
multinationals deployed several well-known 
techniques to strip the profits from sales to U.S. 
customers and avoid being taxed on those profits 
by U.S. tax agencies, either federal or state. Those 
profits were then secreted abroad to escape tax.
The TCJA deemed all the deferred income 
repatriated and subject to tax. But it then applied 
special low tax rates to these profits, effectively 
exempting most of the profits from tax. Even 
worse, the new rules governing net operating 
losses under the CARES Act will allow some of 
the taxpayers that did pay tax on the repatriation 
to get those taxes back.16
But all is not lost: States can still tax this 
deemed repatriation,17 and they can then use that 
money to keep the lights on during this recession. 
Most state corporate tax laws did not and do not 
reach the repatriation, but these laws can be 
changed to do so. Alternatively, and perhaps even 
better, state governments should subject the 
repatriation to a special one-time tax surcharge.
There are many reasons why taxing the 
repatriation is a particularly good way for state 
governments to raise desperately needed 
revenue. Consider just four, below.
First, states would be recouping a national 
loss. The repatriated profits of multinational firms 
reflect a form of national savings that is now being 
squandered. While these profits went untaxed for 
years and years, other taxpayers picked up the 
slack, and critical national initiatives went 
13
For further development of this argument, see Shanske, “White 
Paper on Eliminating the Water’s Edge Election and Moving to 
Mandatory Worldwide Combined Reporting,” State Tax Notes, Sept. 17, 
2018, p. 1181.
14
For further development of this argument, see Shanske and 
Gamage, “Why States Should Tax the GILTI,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 4, 
2019, p. 751; Shanske and Gamage, “Why States Can Tax the GILTI,” 
State Tax Notes, Mar. 18, 2019, p. 967; Shanske and Gamage, “States 
Should Conform to GILTI, Part 3: Elevator Pitch and Q&A,” Tax Notes 
State, Oct. 14, 2019, p. 121.
15
Jeff Sommer, “A Stranded $2 Trillion Overseas Stash Gets Closer to 
Coming Home,” The New York Times, Nov. 4, 2016.
16
Assuming this is the best use for those net operating losses. See 
Josiah P. Child et al., “A Silver Linings Guidebook: Corporate Planning 
for Coronavirus Losses,” Tax Notes Federal, May 18, 2020, p. 1159.
17
Shanske and Gamage, “Will States Step Up in 2020? We Hope So,” 
Tax Notes State, Dec. 16, 2019, p. 977.
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unfunded. Now, as the money returns home, its 
value to the rest of us has been gutted by low tax 
rates and the predictable use of the repatriated 
revenues for corporate stock repurchases rather 
than job creation.18
Second, much of the untaxed profits 
squirreled abroad also escaped state-level taxes. 
Thus, for states, taxing these repatriated profits 
reflects satisfaction of an overdue tax bill avoided 
for years.
Third, since the relevant profits were earned 
previously and then largely went untaxed, taxing 
them now should not undesirably affect the 
corporations’ behavior or their competitive 
position.
Fourth, though we cannot offer precise 
revenue estimates, subjecting the repatriation to 
tax can raise large sums of money, which makes 
sense because even a small slice of $2 trillion is a 
large number.
Here is a back-of-the-envelope estimate as to 
the potential for state revenue. Though we think 
that the states can tax all of the repatriation, let’s 
suppose instead that they tax the 84 percent of the 
repatriation that many taxpayers have not yet 
paid tax on at the federal level because the federal 
tax law gave them a backloaded deferred 
payment option.19 That leaves only $1.6 trillion. 
Now states need to estimate what percentage of 
that revenue was shifted out of the United States 
and what percentage was really earned abroad. A 
defensible estimate, based on the relative size of 
U.S. GDP and empirical work on how much 
income is shifted out of the United States relative 
to other countries,20 might arrive at 35 percent. 
That leaves us with about $560 billion to be taxed. 
We think a rate as high as 20 percent could be 
justified given the taxes these taxpayers avoided 
over the years, but suppose instead the states 
went for the approximate median state corporate 
income tax rate of 5 percent. This would still raise 
$25 billion for the states.
III. Mandatory Worldwide Combination
The states have long confronted the problem 
of how to tax the income of a multistate business. 
In general, as a matter of constitutional law, each 
state can only tax income generated in the state, 
but how does one calculate that for an integrated 
multistate business like a railroad or Apple? If one 
asks the taxpayer to do the calculation, the 
taxpayer will naturally argue that most of its 
income is generated in a low-tax state or a no-tax 
state.
The states arrived at an especially effective 
solution to this problem. Instead of asking a 
multistate business to divide up its income, the 
states asked the business to report all of its 
income, including income nominally earned 
abroad, and then apportioned some of the income 
to each state by means of a formula. The most 
common modern formula uses the percentage of 
sales within a state because, among other reasons, 
the location of a firm’s customers is difficult to 
game. So how much of Apple’s total income is 
generated in a state under this system? The 
answer is the same percentage as the percentage 
of Apple’s sales in a state.
Note that this method — mandatory 
worldwide combination — eliminates the 
incentive to shift income to a low-tax jurisdiction. 
It does not matter where the income is nominally 
earned because it all goes in the same pot and is 
multiplied by the usual formula (percentage of 
sales) to apportion the income.
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld 
mandatory worldwide combination twice.21 
Unfortunately, in the 1980s, our trading partners 
pressured the federal government, which in turn 
pressured the states, not to use mandatory 
worldwide combination. Instead, states offered — 
and still offer — multinational corporations what 
is called a “water’s-edge” election, which, for the 
most part, allows corporations not to combine 
income earned abroad. Naturally, the availability 
of a water’s-edge election encourages 
multinational corporations to shift income abroad 
to escape state taxation.
18
Michael Smolyansky, Gustavo Suarez, and Alexandra Tabova, “U.S. 
Corporations’ Repatriation of Offshore Profits,” Board of Governors of 




“Why States Can Tax the GILTI,” supra note 14, at nn.18, 19.
21
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 321-31 (1994); 
and Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 196 
(1983).
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Eliminating this election should therefore 
allow the states to tax a substantial portion of the 
income that multinational corporations continue 
to shift to low-tax jurisdictions. As noted above, 
one respected estimate is that the states could 
raise about $17 billion22 through moving to 
worldwide combination.
IV. Conforming to GILTI
GILTI is a category of income that was added 
to the federal tax code by the TCJA. GILTI was 
nominally earned by the foreign subsidiary of a 
U.S. corporation that the federal tax law deems to 
really have been earned someplace else, such as 
the United States. In other words, by means of a 
formula, the federal corporate income tax uses 
GILTI to combat the same income-shifting 
problem that is the target of worldwide 
combination.
Though there is some complexity, all a state 
with a corporate income tax has to do is subject 
GILTI to state corporate tax, and then that state is 
also combatting income stripping. The state can 
use the same formula to divide up the income of a 
multinational corporation that it would ordinarily 
use, more or less.
A state cannot conform to GILTI and adopt 
worldwide combination; they are substitutes 
because both are attempts to ferret out shifted 
income. A state could offer taxpayers a choice 
between them. As between worldwide and 
GILTI, worldwide is better from the state’s 
perceptive because it simply includes all the 
income of a multinational corporation without 
the intrusion of the complicated federal formula 
for picking out suspect income. That said, 
conforming to GILTI may well be easier 
politically, as it requires little more than adding a 
sentence to the state corporate income tax that 
the state is taxing GILTI. That conformity would 
raise a lot of revenue. The Penn Wharton Budget 
Model estimates $382 billion in total GILTI for 
2020.23 If the states were to follow the federal 
government and tax half of GILTI and do so at a 
5 percent rate, then the taxes would yield almost 
$10 billion annually. To be sure, this is a pre-
pandemic estimate, like all the estimates we 
provide, and the final number is likely to be less 
during the recession. That granted, this would 
still be sound tax policy, and the revenue will 
likely remain substantial even during the 
recession given that some firms, quite possibly 
with a lot of GILTI, will remain profitable.
V. Temporary Corporate Income Tax Surcharge
Many businesses will suffer losses during 
this recession. A few will prosper. It is not 
imposing a moral judgment to suggest that 
businesses that do relatively well should pay 
more in taxes to offset the increased budgetary 
costs of the downturn. Put concretely, we may be 
grateful to Amazon for its delivery service, but it 
still seems appropriate to tax it on its profits so 
that there will still be a main street when this is 
all over. It might be particularly appealing to tax 
a firm that is profiting during the recession on its 
“excess” profits,24 but designing and 
implementing a new tax would be a heavy 
administrative lift for a state during a pandemic.
Fortunately, the regular corporate income tax 
is already something of an excess profits tax, to 
the extent that by definition it will only tax 
profitable firms, and those firms are likely to be 
more rare during the deep recession that we are 
rapidly entering. As for those few profitable 
firms, a temporarily higher corporate income tax 
rate would reflect that we are now in a time 
when putting a greater share of profits towards 
the common good is especially urgent. For 
instance, suppose that a state were to adopt a 3 
percent corporate income tax surcharge for the 
next three years. This could work to raise some 
extra revenues in the depths of the recession 
from those most able to pay. This surcharge 
could be imposed only above a threshold, so as 
to apply only to larger businesses that are 
22
See Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, supra note 10.
23
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, “Global 
Intangible Low-Taxed Income, 2020-2030: Estimates for the U.S. and 
Massachusetts” (Feb. 25, 2020).
24
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “It’s Time to Revive the Excess Profits Tax,” 
The American Prospect, Mar. 27, 2020. For further detail, see Avi-Yonah, 
“Taxes in the Time of Coronavirus: Is It Time to Revive the Excess Profits 
Tax?” University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 671, May 
19, 2020.
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unlikely to face serious liquidity problems and 
regarding which the corporate income tax can 
also serve antitrust-related goals.25
VI. Suspension of Some Corporate 
Tax Credits and Deductions
States offer a multitude of tax credits. The 
consensus is that these do little to encourage 
economic development, but this is not the time to 
fight that battle. What we want to emphasize is 
that some tax credits have grown so large that 
they are undermining the state corporate income 
tax and could dramatically reduce the value of 
these suggested reforms. Our primary target is 
state R&D credits. These are expensive, costing 
California alone almost $2 billion annually.26 That 
is about 20 percent of all that California collects in 
corporate income tax. Even worse, R&D credits 
can be stockpiled. It is likely that many of the 
taxpayers shifting profits have also been 
stockpiling credits. We hope that a time will come 
to reconsider state R&D credits more wholesale. 
But, as with the temporary surcharge we 
proposed above, states especially need to be able 
to tax actors with greater ability to pay now, in this 
economic downturn. R&D credits should thus be 
suspended, for, say, three years.
VII. Reform the Sales Factor
As noted above, states have now shifted to 
dividing up the income of a multinational 
corporation by using a formula based on the 
percentage of sales in a state. This approach has 
turned out to be expensive. In 2015-16 — the last 
time it calculated this number — California 
estimated that it loses about $1 billion per year27 
because of this shift, about 10 percent of its total 
corporate income tax collection. How can that be? 
California is a big market state, after all. The 
reason is that taxpayers have gotten very good at 
gaming the sales factor. Reforming the sales factor 
could therefore raise a lot of revenue, especially if 
some of the other reforms listed above are also 
adopted. We propose two reforms below.28
First, states generally permit sales to be 
located where a middleman — e.g., a wholesaler 
— takes title to the goods. The problem with this 
rule is that it encourages taxpayers to sell to 
intermediaries in low-tax jurisdictions. The law of 
the sales factor should thus be refined to 
apportion a sale to its ultimate destination in all 
cases, including sales of tangible personal 
property. For example, a corporation could look to 
information it retains in the usual course of 
business, because surely businesses generally 
know where their customers are. If the 
corporation does not have this information and 
cannot obtain it from its wholesalers, then it could 
use any reasonable method, including 
population, to fill in the gaps.
A second reform we propose to the sales factor 
would be for corporations to be required to 
submit an accounting of where they would locate 
all their sales using the method they have used for 
the state in question. The corporation should also 
report where they are reporting sales to other 
states with the single sales factor. It might not 
seem odd to a California auditor, for instance, if 
California’s sales factor for a corporation was only 
8 percent — so a bit below the state’s share of U.S. 
GDP — but it would rightfully raise alarm bells if 
the disclosure of this method revealed a 10 
percent sales factor for Nevada — or the Cayman 
Islands.
VIII. Expand the Corporate Income 
Tax to All Entities
There has been a shift over the last decades 
from the corporate form; prominent 
commentators link the shift to the decline in the 
productivity of the state corporate income tax.29 In 
25
Avi-Yonah and Lior Frank, “Antitrust and the Corporate Tax: Why 
We Need Progressive Corporate Tax Rates,” Tax Notes Federal, May 18, 
2020, p. 1199. Note that pairing progressive tax rates with a state 
corporate tax base that has been successfully broadened through moving 
to worldwide consolidation or conforming to GILTI would be a sensible 
permanent reform.
26
California Department of Finance, “Tax Expenditure Report 2019-
20.”
27
California Department of Finance, “Tax Expenditure Report 2015-
16.”
28
A new essay with further details is to come, but if you can’t wait, 
see: Avi-Yonah and Kimberly A. Clausing, “Toward a 21st-Century 
International Tax Regime,” Tax Notes International, Aug. 26, 2019, p. 839, 
846-47; Shanske, “Expanding State Fiscal Capacity, Part I: Combining an 
Entity-Level Consumption Tax, Improved Sales Factor Apportionment, 
and a Tax on a Federal Windfall (the QBI Deduction),” 22 Fla. Tax Rev. 
448, 487-99 (2019).
29
William F. Fox and LeAnn Luna, “Do Limited Liability Companies 
Explain Declining State Corporate Tax Revenues?” 33(6) Pub. Fin. Rev. 
690, 715-16 (2005).
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any event, it does not make much sense for two 
large business to be subject to different tax 
regimes if one is a corporation and the other is not. 
It could be argued that we would not want to pull 
millions of small businesses into the corporate tax 
regime, and that makes sense. Yet the corporate 
tax could be extended to just the largest 
noncorporate business with little loss of revenue.30 
This is another example of a change that has long 
made sense and could yield significant revenue, 
especially as the economy improves.
IX. Conclusion
To start at the beginning, it is the federal 
government that ought to be the prime mover in 
this crisis. The fact that the states can raise 
revenue through sensible reforms of their tax 
systems should not be seen as somehow excusing 
the (so-far) inadequate response at the federal 
level. Yet, against the background of this federal 
failure, the states should not compound the crisis 
by engaging in cuts that hurt the least fortunate 
before raising taxes on the more fortunate. And as 
to raising taxes on those most able to pay, the 
states should first seek to broaden their tax bases 
to raise revenue from taxpayers who have long 
avoided paying their fair share. This avoidance 
has gone on for so long and through so many 
channels that the states stand to gain substantial 
revenue just by doing what they should have 
done a long time ago. 
30
Matthew J. Knittel and Susan C. Nelson, “How Would Small 
Business Owners Fare Under a Business Entity Tax?” 64(4) Nat’l Tax J. 
949, 974 (2011) (“Using a $10 million gross income and deduction test, 
we find that 99 percent of the entities deemed a business (54 percent of 
total filers) are also a small business, and they reported 18 percent of 
total business income and 16 percent of net business income for tax year 
2007”).
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